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HONOR THY FATHER AND MOTHER: PAYING THE
MEDICAL BILLS OF ELDERLY PARENTS
Renae Reed Patrick*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the elderly population increases and medical costs skyrocket,
federal and state governments feel increasing pressures to diminish
drains on government treasuries caused by the provision of medi-
cal care to the elderly. One possible solution would be to require
children to shoulder more of the costs of caring for their parents
than they already bear as federal and state taxpayers. This article
examines this approach and suggests that such a policy is contrary
to both federal and state laws.
The United States government has developed two programs to
help elderly Americans pay their medical bills: Medicaid1 and
Medicare.2 Medicare is a nationwide federal program that provides
health insurance to most individuals aged sixty-five and over,3
without regard to income or assets.4 In fiscal year 1982, approxi-
mately 26.1 million aged persons were covered by Medicare." Medi-
* Attorney with Legal Aid Society of the Roanoke Valley, Inc., Roanoke, Virginia; B.A.,
University of Colorado, 1970; J.D., College of William and Mary, 1981.
The author wishes to thank M.J. Morrison of Hamline University School of Law for her
suggestions and encouragement and Toby Edelman of the National Senior Citizens Law
Center whose articles in The Nursing Home Law Letter were the impetus for this work and
on which part two of this work is based. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of her present or past employers.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1982). Medicaid also provides medical assistance to the
under-age-65 low-income blind or disabled and to families with dependent children.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395xx (1982). Medicare also provides for certain disabled persons
under 65 and certain workers and their dependents who need kidney transplantation or
dialysis.
3. The program is divided into two parts: (1) Hospital Insurance for short-stay hospital
in-patient care which is supported almost entirely by part of the Social Security payroll tax,
id. §§ 1395c-1395i-2, and (2) Supplementary Medical Insurance, an optional insurance
which covers physician visits and other ambulatory care financed through monthly premi-
ums paid by enrollees and the government, id. §§ 1395j-1395w.
4. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ACTION ON AGING LEGISLATION IN THE 97TH CON-
GRESS 3 (March 1983) (information paper prepared for the Special Committee on Aging,
U.S. Senate) [hereinafter cited as ACTION ON AGING].
5. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF MEDICARE BENEFITS: Is-
SUES AND OPTIONS (March 1983) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING STRUCTURE].
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caid is a Federal-State matching program which provides free med-
ical assistance to low-income, aged persons." In fiscal year 1982,
approximately 3.5 million aged persons received assistance through
Medicaid. 7
Federal outlays for Medicare and Medicaid have increased
nearly 600 percent since 1970.8 It is predicted that the Medicare
fund's reserves will disappear in 1987 or 1988, 9 whereupon rapidly
growing deficits will be generated annually. If the funding program
for Medicare is not revised, the deficit may exceed $300 billion by
1995.10 Medicaid payments have increased from $1.9 million in
1972 to $9.8 million in 1981.11
Increasing costs in the two programs are cause for concern in the
government and among program recipients and their relatives.
Presently, there are no particularly palatable solutions to the fi-
nancial problems of the programs. The most commonly proposed
solution to Medicare's financial woes has been to require patients
to share more of the cost of their hospitalization.12
Some states have attempted to cope with soaring Medicaid costs
by enacting 3 or proposing"' new family responsibility laws. Other
states have attempted to modify existing laws to require reim-
bursement to the state by the adult children for Medicaid benefits
received by their parents. 15 Because the federal government has
traditionally insisted that such state laws violate the intent of the
federal Medicaid law,' there has been infrequent state enforce-
6. ACTION ON AGING, supra note 4, at 6.
7. Id.
8. President's Message to Congress concerning Health Incentives Reform Program, 129
CONG. REC. S1717 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1983).
9. CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at 2.
10. Id. at 66, Table A-1. These projections asume that reimbursement limits under the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) are extended.
11. See 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 130 (1983) (Table 6: "Medicaid Vendor Payments").
12. CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at xi.
13. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 511 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-149.1 (Cum. Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 56-210 (Cum. Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 49.47(4)(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1984).
14. According to the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, there
were eleven states considering family responsibility law as of September 12, 1983. Letter
from John Heinz, Chairman, U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, to Renae R. Patrick,
(Sept. 12, 1983). Since that date ten of the eleven states decided not to modify their laws.
The eleventh state, Indiana, still has a bill pending before its General Assembly. See Ind. S.
504 (1985).
15. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
16. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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ment of existing relative responsibility laws. However, this practice
may be changing. In February 1983, the Department of Health and
Human Services (the Department) issued a policy clarification en-
titled "Treatment of Contributions from Relatives to Medicaid
Applicants or Recipients."'17 This Transmittal provides that states
may require "adult family members to support adult relatives
without violating the Medicaid statute by the use of a statute of
general applicability."'18 The Transmittal may be construed as an
implicit invitation to states to enact relative responsibility laws.19
This recent change in a long-standing policy of one federal pro-
gram providing health care to the elderly may signal a similar
change in other federal programs delivering health care coverage to
the elderly. In light of pressure to require additional patient con-
tributions to Medicare costs, it is foreseeable that the recent shift
in Medicaid policy will be paralleled by a change in Medicare pol-
icy. Such a change could require monetary contributions by adult
children to either the health insurance costs of parents or to hospi-
tal and treatment costs rendered to their needy parents treated
under Medicare.
This article will examine the Virginia family responsiblity stat-
ute and recently promulgated federal Medicaid policy relating to
contributions made by children to the health care costs of their
parents. The conclusion reached is that adult children cannot be
required to make financial contributions for medical assistance
provided to their parents through Medicaid under either the Vir-
ginia family responsibility statute or federal Medicaid policy.
II. RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICAL COSTS
In 1983, the Department of Health and Human Services pub-
lished Transmittal Number 2, section 3812, "Treatment of Contri-
17. 1983-1 MEDICARE & MEDICAID Gum (CCH) T 32,457 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
TRANsMrrrA].
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is the agency of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services that administers Medicare, Medicaid and other programs
related to delivery of health care services. HCFA employees have no direct responsibility for
the operation of individual Medicaid programs; such programs are administered at the state
and local level. HCFA is responsible, however, for oversight of the state administration of
the program through the promulgation of regulations and the issuance of interpretive guide-
lines to clarify these regulations. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.10-.803 (1983).
18. TRmmsirrAL, supra note 17, at 10,287.
19. Relative Responsibility, 66 NuRsING Hoim L. LMrrER 4 (Nov. 1982).
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butions from Relatives to Medicaid Applicants or Recipients."2
This Transmittal states that under both the Social Security Act
(Medicaid) and Medicaid regulations, a state Medicaid plan may
not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual
for any applicant or recipient of Medicaid, except that income and
resources of spouses may be considered as available to each other,
and income and resources of parents may be considered as availa-
ble to children under age 21 or children over 21 if blind or dis-
abled.2 Thus, the state may assume that the income and resources
of spouses and parents are available for coverage of medical ex-
penses of spouses and children, but may not consider a child's abil-
ity to contribute to the parents' medical care. The state may re-
duce its Medicaid payments to elderly parents only to the extent
that children in fact do contribute to a parent's medical costs.
The Transmittal further states that "[t]he [Social Security] law
and [Medicaid] regulations permit states to require adult family
members to support adult relatives without violating the Medicaid
statute by the use of a statute of general applicability."'22 The pol-
icy of the Transmittal would require support under a state statute
of general applicability and not under a specific state Medicaid
plan requirement applicable only to Medicaid recipients. There-
fore, the Transmittal reasons that there would be no violation of
the Social Security Act prohibition against considering financial re-
sponsibility of relatives other than parents or spouses.
This Transmittal is contrary to the federal statute it interprets
and to the legislative history of that statute. The Medical Assis-
tance Program [Medicaid], enacted by Congress in 1965,23 prohib-
its states from requiring relatives other than spouses or parents to
contribute to the cost of medical care. The statute requires that a
state Medicaid plan "include reasonable standards [which] do not
take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for
20. TRANSMITrAL, supra note 17.
21. Id. at 10,287.
22. Id.
The transmittal was reportedly issued in response to an August 27, 1981 letter from
the Indiana Attorney General questioning whether enforcement of Indiana's relative
responsibility statute would be consistent with federal Medicaid law. The Attorney
General's Official Opinion No. 81-15 ... interpreted [the Social Security Act] to pre-
clude Medicaid use of relative responsibility other than the reponsiblity of spouses or
parents for children. It concluded that the Medicaid statute prohibits actions against
adult children of indigent parents receiving Medicaid benefits.
Relative Responsibility, supra note 19, at 2 n.6.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396o (1982).
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any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such
applicant or recipient is such individual's spouse or such individ-
ual's child who is under age 21 . . .. "I Although this language
could be interpreted as only prohibiting attribution of a relative's
income to an applicant or recipient, the legislative history suggests
the broader congressional intent of prohibiting the requirement of
monetary contributions by any relative other than a spouse or par-
ent of a recipient.
In its hearing prior to the enactment of the Medical Assistance
Program, the Senate Finance Committee stated that it believed it
proper to "expect spouses to support each other and parents to be
held accountable for the support of their minor children and their
blind or permanently and totally disabled children . . ..- The
Committee concluded, however, that beyond such degrees of rela-
tionship, Medicaid support requirements were often destructive
and harmful to the relationships among members of the family
group. Therefore, the Committee decided that "[s]tates may not
include in their plans provisions for requiring contributions from
relatives other than a spouse or the parent of a minor child or chil-
dren over 21 who are blind or permanently and totally disabled.
26
When considering amendments to the Medicaid Plan in 1967,
the Senate Finance Committee studied the practice of supplemen-
tation of nursing home care costs by relatives. Once again, the
Committee determined the practice of supplementation by rela-
tives to be undesirable.17 Neither the Committee nor Congress ad-
dressed the issue in legislation, due to representations by the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare 28 (HEW), that
supplementation would be phased out by January 1, 1971.29 It is
clear that the federal Medicaid statute and its legislative history
demonstrate that only the spouse and parents of a Medicaid recipi-
ent can be held financially responsible for the costs of medical as-
sistance provided to the recipient.
In addition to being inconsistent with the federal statute that it
24. Id. § 1396a(a)(17)(D).
25. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1943, 2018.
26. Id.
27. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-88, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2834, 3026.
28. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was the predecessor to the De-
partments of Education and Health and Human Services.
29. See Relative Responsibility, 56 NURSING HoAtE L. LET ER 3 (Feb. 1982).
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interprets, the Transmittal is also inconsistent with federal regula-
tions relating to Medicaid in general, and specifically to state
Medicaid plans. All federal regulations published throughout the
history of the Medicaid plan have been in conformity on the issue
of relative responsibility; relative responsibility has always been
limited to parents for children and spouses for spouses.
Federal regulations addressed relative responsibility for the first
time in 1969. The regulations stated that a state Medicaid plan
must "[p]rovide that financial responsibility of any individual for
any applicant or recipient of medical assistance will be limited to
the responsibility of spouse for spouse and of parents for children
under age 21, or blind, or permanently and totally disabled."30
In 1971, the Medicaid regulations concerning eligibility were
augmented. The new regulations provided that a state Medicaid
plan must require, as a condition of eligibility for medical assis-
tance, that:
[n]o person unrelated to the applicant or recipient is held financially
responsible for him; nor is any condition of eligibility imposed that
holds a relative responsible who is not the spouse of the individual
who needs medical care or services or the parent of such individual,
who is under 21, or is blind, or is permanently and totally disabled. 1
In 1977, the first substantial change in over nine years was made
to the language of federal regulations concerning relative contribu-
tions.2 The pertinent sections were rewritten to state that "[tihe
financial responsibility (including later collection for assistance
paid) of any individual for any applicant or recipient of medical
assistance will be limited to the responsibility of spouse for spouse
and of parents for children under age 21 (or blind or disabled). 33
HEW clarified the prohibition on relative responsibility as not be-
ing limited solely to eligibility. The prohibition extended to all
possible methods of holding relatives responsible, including reim-
bursement to the state for Medicaid payments previously made on
a recipient's behalf.
30. 45 C.F.R. § 248.21(a)(5) (1969).
31. Id. § 248.10(c)(5) (1972).
32. 42 Fed. Reg. 2684 (1977).
33. 45 C.F.R. § 248.3(b)(1)(iii) (1978); see also id. § 248.21(a)(2)(ii) (substantially same
language). In 1977, the regulations were transferred from 45 C.F.R. to 42 C.F.R. with no
substantive change. 42 Fed. Reg. 52827 (1977). 45 C.F.R. § 248.3 became 42 C.F.R. § 448.3.
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In 1978, the federal regulations were rewritten to read:
Limitation on the financial responsibility of relatives
Except for a spouse of an individual or a parent for a child who
is under age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must not
(a) Consider income and resources of any relative availa-
ble to an individual; nor
(b) Collect reimbursement from any relative for amounts
paid by the agency for services provided to an
individual.34
This language has remained unchanged since its initial
publication.3 5
The Department's own published regulations interpreting the
Medicaid plan totally contradict the Transmittal on the point of
relative responsibility. Moreover, the legislative history of the
Medicaid plan and the Medicaid statute disagree completely with
the Transmittal's interpretation concerning relative responsibility.
III. RELATIVE RESPONSIBLITY LAWS
Relative financial responsibility laws have a long history. The
source of the legal duty to support parents may have come origi-
nally from the Ten Commandments.36 As early as the third century
A.D. there were statutory mutual obligations of support and main-
tenance between children and parents in Roman society.3 7 In medi-
eval Europe, obligations to relatives varied regionally. Statutory
Roman law applied to southern Europe.38 In northern Europe, eth-
ics dictated support of relatives. 9 This ethical standard developed,
by custom and usage, into a right of support from child to parent
and often extended to include support to grandchildren, grandpar-
ents and, on occasion, siblings.40 Even in northern areas of Europe,
Roman law supplied a written basis for the custom, and became
34. 42 C.F.R. § 435.602 (1979); see also id. § 436.602. The regulations were rewritten as
part of Operation Common Sense to present existing regulations in clearer, simpler lan-
guage. 43 Fed. Reg. 45176 (1978).
35. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.602, 436.602 (1983).
36. Exodus 20:12.
37. Van Houtte & Breda, Maintenance of the Aged by Their Adult Children, 12 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 645, 649 (1978).
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the foundation for subsequent substantive rules and laws relating
to relative support.41 Much later, a law imposing a duty of parental
support on children was incorporated into the Napoleonic Code.42
This law was the basis for Civil Code relative responsibility provi-
sions which are currently in effect in Belgium and Louisiana.43
Statutory relative responsibility was enacted by the English Par-
liament in 1597 and applied only to parents and children." In
1601, this responsibility was extended to additional collateral rela-
tives.45 American family responsibility laws emerged from these
sixteenth and seventeenth century British provisions.
Today, twenty-seven jurisdictions in the United States have
family support laws requiring children to provide assistance to
their needy parents. 6 Generally, this responsibility is triggered by
the needy parent filing a petition with the court for a hearing.47
41. Id.
42. CODE OF NAPOLEON art. 205, § 1. "Children are liable for the maintenance of their
parents and other ascendants in need." See Van Houtte & Breda, supra note 37, at 651
n.10.
43. See Van Houtte & Breda, supra note 37, at 651; LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 229 (West
1970).
44. 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3, § 7 (1597). For a general history of statutory responsibility, see Lopes,
Filial Support and Family Solidarity, 6 PAc. L.J. 509-14 (1975).
45. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, § VI (1601). "The father and grandfather, the mother and grand-
mother, and the children of everie poore olde blind lame and impotent person, or other
poore person not able to worke, beinge of a sufficient abilitie, shall at their own Chardges
releive and maintain everie suche poore person, in that manner and accordinge to that rate,
as by the Justices of the Peace of that Countie where such sufficient persons dwell, or the
greater number of them, at their generall Quarter-Sessions shalbe assessed; upon paine that
everie one of them shall forfeite twenty shillings for everie monthe which they shall faile
therein." Id., quoted in Tully, Family Responsiblity Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitu-
tional Imposition, 5 FAM. L.Q. 32, 46 (1971).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.030 (1983); CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 206, 242 (West 1984); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-215 (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 (Repl. Vol. 1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 36-12-3 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-1002 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-2-9-1 (Burns
Repl. Vol. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.2 (West Supp. 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.4731
(West 1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 442-443 (1981); MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. art.
27, § 104 (Repl. Vol. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 20 (West Supp. 1984); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-214, -301 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. §
428.070 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.2 (1978) and § 546-A:2 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
44:1-140 (West Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-326.1 (1981); NJ). CENT. CODE § 14-09-10
(Repl. Vol. 1981); OL REV. STAT. § 109.010 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (Purdon
Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-10-1 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-7-27 (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 202
(1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 9-5-9 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-215 (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503
(Repl. Vol. 1981).
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Some states allow the petition to be filed by welfare workers.4
The Commonwealth of Virginia has long had such a family re-
sponsibility law. As first enacted in 1920, the law provided that
persons sixteen years of age or older, who had sufficient earning
capacity, were required to support their parents who lived in cities
of one hundred thousand inhabitants or more.4 9 This provision was
amended to require support of parents in destitute or necessitous
circumstances.5 0 Subsequent changes maintained this general ap-
plicability language.5 1 An exception to the statute was added in
1975 to provide that parents receiving public assistance need not
be supported by their children.5 2 However, a 1982 amendment 3
provides that children are responsible for costs incurred in provid-
ing medical assistance to their parents pursuant to the Virginia
Medicaid Plan, if such financial responsibility is not restricted by
the plan itself.5
4
The 1982 amendment also provides a procedure to compel reim-
bursement to the Commonwealth. Proceedings are to be instituted
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, in the name
of the Commonwealth, by the state agency administering the pro-
gram of assistance. The portion of costs which the child must reim-
burse are those determined by the court to be reasonable. Costs of
institutionalization of a parent are limited to no more than sixty
months of institutionalization.5
48. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-2-9-1 (Burns Repl. Vol. 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 273, §
20 (West Supp. 1984).
49. VA. CODE, ch. 324 (1922).
50. Id., ch. 324 of Acts 1922 (Supp., Pollard, 1922). The 1922 amendment applied only to
cities of the first class. An amendment to the statute in 1928 deleted the references to cites
of the first class.
51. Id. § 1944a (1942).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 1975). ("This section shall not apply... if a par-
ent is otherwise eligible for and is receiving public assistance or services under a federal or
state program.").
53. Id. (Repl. Vol. 1983).
54. Id. "To the extent that the financial responsibility of children for any part of the costs
incurred in providing medical assistance to their parents pursuant to the plan provided for
in § 32.1-74 of the Code of Virginia is not restricted by that plan. . . the provisions of this
section shall apply."
55. Id.
A proceeding may be instituted in accordance with this section in the name of the
Commonwealth by the state agency administering the program of assistance or ser-
vices in order to compel any child of a parent receiving such assistance or services to
reimburse the Commonwealth for such portion of the costs incurred in providing the
assistance or services as the court may determine to be reasonable. If costs are in-
curred for the institutionalization of a parent, the children shall in no case be respon-
sible for such costs for more than sixty months of institutionalization.
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Therefore, under current Virginia law, an adult child may be
forced by the state to contribute to medical costs incurred by the
state in providing medical assistance to the child's parents, even
when the parent has been receiving public assistance.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
Virginia Code section 20-88, as amended in 1982, is inconsistent
with the federal Medicaid statute5 6 and the corresponding regula-
tions.57 Both the federal statute and the regulations expressly limit
any state agency to consideration of income and resources solely
from spouses and parents of Medicaid recipients. Medicaid regula-
tions further prohibit any state agency from collecting reimburse-
ment from any relative of a Medicaid recipient except from
spouses and parents.5 8 The Virginia statute, in direct contraven-
tion of federal mandates, imposes financial responsibility upon
adult children for the costs -of medical assistance provided to their
parents by the State Medicaid agency. The statute requires chil-
dren to make restitution to the Commonwealth for its expendi-
tures on the parents through Medicaid. To this end, the Depart-
ment of Welfare, which is charged with administering the Virginia
Medicaid Plan, is authorized to institute proceedings in court to
compel reimbursement by the Medicaid recipient's adult child.5 9
Even if the Transmittal were a valid interpretation of federal
law, it would be inapplicable to the Virginia statute. The Trans-
mittal speaks of a "State Statute of general applicability."60 It is
this general application of a statute, as opposed to a specific or
special application directed only to Medicaid recipients, which
would save a state relative responsibility statute from violating the
Federal Medicaid Act.61
While purporting to be of general applicability, the Virginia stat-
ute, because of the 1982 amendment, is, instead, a statute of spe-
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1982). For a discussion of the statute, see supra text
accompanying note 24.
57. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.602, 436.602 (1983). For discussion of regulations, see supra text ac-
companying notes 34-35.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a)(2) (1983).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
60. Transmittal, supra note 17.
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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cial applicability for two reasons.6 2 First, the requirement that chil-
dren contribute to the cost of medical assistance provided to their
parents under the state Medicaid plan creates a specific financial
responsibility. Second, the 1982 amendment directly refers to sec-
tion 32.1-74 of the Virginia Code. That section, the Virginia Medi-
caid Plan, mandates that the State Medicaid agency establish a
program requiring adult children to reimburse the state for costs of
medical assistance provided to their parents under the plan. 3
Therefore, section 20-88 creates a specific state Medicaid require-
ment, applicable only to Medicaid recipients, which is contrary to
federal law and regulations as well as to the Transmittal. Because
the Virginia family responsibility statute is applicable only under
the terms of the State Medicaid Plan, the Virginia statute violates
the requirements of the federal Medicaid statute.
The Virginia family responsibility statute, as amended in 1982,
has not been tested in court.6 4 Similar statutes of other states,
however, have been challenged as a denial of equal protection, due
process and privacy rights, and as an imposition of double taxa-
tion.6 5 In the face of such claims, state courts have consistently up-
held family responsibility laws.
The California family responsibility law was challenged on equal
protection grounds in Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGil-
very."' The court held that, because the support obligation was to
be absolute in each relative, the classification of relatives was non-
discriminatory; the collectibility of the obligation was contingent
62. A special statute is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or
operates upon a selected class, rather than upon the public in general. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1570 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). A statute is general if its terms apply to and its provisions
operate upon all persons and subject matter in like situations. See generally Gandy v. Eliza-
beth City County, 179 Va. 340, 344, 19 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1942).
63. The Board shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services such amendments to the state plan for medical
assistance as may be permitted by federal law to establish a program of family assis-
tance whereby children over the age of eighteen years shall make reasonable contri-
butions, as determined by regulations of the Board toward the cost of providing med-
ical assistance to their parents.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-74D (Cum. Supp. 1984).
64. But see Bagwell v. Doyle, 187 Va. 844, 48 S.E.2d 299 (1948); Mitchell-Powers Hard-
ware Co. v. Eaton, 171 Va. 255, 198 S.E. 496 (1938). Before the 1982 amendment, the Vir-
ginia statute was the basis for a child's general financial responsibility for a parent.
65. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d 1159 (1977).
66. 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d 689 (1958). But cf. Levy & Gross, Constitutional Implica-
tions of Parental Support Laws, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 517, 531 (1979) (authors conclude that
parental support statutes are in direct violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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only upon the relative's ability to pay. In a later California case,
Swoap v. Supreme Court of Sacramento County,67 the court rea-
soned that the "rational basis" test, rather than the "strict scru-
tiny" test, was applicable because those charged with financial re-
sponsibility were selected on the basis of parentage, rather than on
the basis of traditional suspect classifications such as race or sex.
Three years before Swoap, a District of Columbia court, in Groover
v. Essex County Welfare Board,68 had applied this same reasoning
and determined that classification of children who are charged
with the support obligation of their parents is a rational classifica-
tion not violative of equal protection.
The constitutional issue of taking of private property for public
use without just compensation was also addressed and rejected by
California in McGilvery.6 9 It was determined that the responsible
relative receives a substantial equivalent from the agents of the
state who manage the institution where the supported relative re-
sides. An Alabama court, in Atkins v. Curtis,7 0 had also rejected a
takings argument by deciding that the statute establishes liability
only upon those subject to it, rather than transferring property
from one citizen to another.
One of the earliest challenges to relative responsibility laws was
in 1949, in the Arizona case of Maricopa County v. Douglas.71
There the court rejected a charge of double taxation which was
based on the argument that payments under relative responsibility
laws impose a tax in addition to taxes already paid, and from
which a portion already maintains a social welfare program.
In 1956, an Oregon court found procedural due process to be sat-
isfied in Mallatt v. Luihn,72 where notice and opportunity for a
hearing were extended to the responsible relative prior to enforce-
ment of collection through the state's enforcement of judgment
procedures. During this pre-enforcement hearing, the responsible
relative could defend on the ground that the alleged needy person
is not, in fact, in need, or that the relative is financially unable to
make the contribution. The court held that no notice to relatives
of later financial responsibility was required before extending ben-
67. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 505, 516 P.2d 840, 850, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 147 (1973).
68. 264 A.2d 143 (D.C. 1970).
69. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d at -, 329 P.2d at 699.
70. 259 Ala. 311, 66 So. 2d 455 (1953).
71. 69 Ariz. 35, -, 208 P.2d 646, 649 (1949).
72. 206 Or. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956).
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efits to the parents.
Opinions of the Attorneys General of Idaho73 and Tennessee
74
have declared their respective state family responsibility statutes,
which require adult children to reimburse the State Medicaid
Agency for medical costs expended on their parents, to be contrary
to federal Medicaid statutes and regulations, and therefore
unenforceable.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
Policy arguments have been propounded in favor of the termina-
tion of relative responsibility laws. One view suggests that the ad-
ministrative costs of collecting from the legally responsibile family
members outweigh the savings to the state in the form of lower
welfare payments;75 the collection procedures create a new and
costly bureaucracy. Another criticism is that parents are reluctant
to require their children to support them.76 The parents' knowl-
edge that a child might be required to reimburse the state may
impede many needy parents from applying for state medical assis-
tance.7 An additional policy argument is that the enforcement
73. Idaho Code § 32-1008A is applicable only to Medicaid recipients. Although it is in the
form of a statute rather than a Medicaid plan, we feel that this is a distinction with-
out consequence in that the net effect on Medicaid recipients and their relatives is
identical to that which would have resulted had the state merely adoptd a plan which
required contributions solely from the relatives of Medicaid patients. It is our opinion
that the limitation of the applicability of § 32-1008A to relatives of Medicaid recipi-
ents renders it a statute of special rather than general applicability and, as a conse-
quence, we believe that it does not comport with the requirements of the transmittal
or with the Social Security laws which the transmittal attempts to interpret. There-
fore, it is our opinion that Idaho is not in compliance with the requirements of the
federal Medicaid program.
Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. No. 84-7 (March 23, 1984).
74. This statute [TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-23-115 (Supp. 1984)] by its own terms applies
only to "parties" who are "responsible" for the support of persons receiving medical
assistance funds .... Because the statute is clearly limited in scope and application
to the support of persons receiving or eligible for Medicaid funds, it is not a statute of
general applicability within the terms of the eligibility transmittal .... [T]he only
general support obligations imposed by state law are those upon parents and spouses.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-229, 36-820. Therefore, only parents or spouses may be re-
quired to make such reimbursements to the state.
Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. (August 31, 1983).
75. Acford, Reducing Medicaid Expenditures Through Family Responsiblity: Critique of
a Recent Proposal, 5 Am. J.L. & MED. 59, 62 n.18 (Spring 1979); see also Rosenbaum, Are
Family Responsiblity Laws Constitutional?, 1 FA. L.Q., 59-61 (Dec. 1967).
76. Acford, supra note 75, at 75; Levy & Gross, supra note 66, at 530.
77. Acford, supra note 75, at 76; Lopes, supra note 44, at 527.
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mechanism may not reach out-of-state relatives even though the
state statute may apply with equal force to relatives residing in
and out of the state. 8
Another argument against family responsibility laws is that chil-
dren forced to support their parents may do so at the cost of de-
priving their own immediate families of necessities. This could en-
courage a perpetuation of poverty. Moreover, such required
support may cause resentment and guilt in the children, as well as
a lack of identity and independence in the parents. The potential
for weakening of family ties is great.79
Finally, family responsibility laws may be unenforceable. The
elderly simply may not give Medicaid agencies the names of their
adult children. 0
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal Medicaid statutes and regulations have consistently
prohibited states from requiring relatives other than spouses or
parents to contribute to the cost of the Medicaid recipient's medi-
cal care. The 1983 Transmittal, "Treatment of Contributions from
Relatives to Medicaid Applicants or Recipients," incorrectly inter-
prets the Medicaid statute and companion regulations as allowing
the requirement of contributions by the recipient's adult children
to the cost of a Medicaid recipient's medical care.
The Virginia family responsibility law, as amended in 1982, is
equally inconsistent with federal Medicaid statutes and regula-
tions, in that the Virginia law imposes financial responsibility upon
adult children for the costs of medical assistance provided to their
parents by the State Medicaid agency, and authorizes the state
agency to collect reimbursement from the Medicaid recipient's
adult children.
Even if the reasoning of the 1983 Transmittal were to be fol-
lowed, the Virginia statute would still violate the federal Medicaid
law. The Virginia law is a statute of special application, as opposed
78. BOND, OUR NEEDY AGED 136, 352 (1954); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 62.
Although all states subscribe to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in its
original revised form, not all have family responsibility laws. Such laws that do exist differ
in scope and coverage of relative responsiblity, and therefore preclude enforcement by
courts of other states.
79. Lopes, supra note 44, at 526.
80. See Relative Responsibility, 56 NURSING HOME L. LETrER 3 (Feb. 1983).
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to one of general applicability as authorized by the Transmittal.
The Virginia statute is applicable only to children of Medicaid re-
cipients, and is a specific State Medicaid Plan requirement appli-
cable only to Medicaid recipients.
An adult child should not be required to make financial contri-
butions for medical assistance provided to parents under Medicaid,
under either the Virginia family responsibility law or under federal
Medicaid policy.

